Who Are They Trying To Convince?
Oct 28, 03 | 11:27 pm by John T. KennedyWhen people argue for determinism who are they trying to persuade? Doesn’t argument itself imply that the person to be persuaded must be free to choose between alternatives? Greg Swann writes: “I am a materialist, and like Ayn Rand, this creates a real problem for me with respect to will, volition, free moral agency.” The problem Swann is talking about is determinism. But what’s the problem and whose problem is it if Swann’s thoughts and acts are determined? Swann dismisses Rand’s axiomatic dismissal of determinism, but how is one to proceed from the premise that one’s self is determined?
Swann: “…I recognize that all the evidence of physics–that we have so far, an important caveat–is with the physicists”
I think we can be pretty confident that the evidence of physics will always be with the physicists, I fail to see how physics could produce any other sort of evidence. I freely admit I do not understand how my free will is compatible with physics. But I know that I cannot be free to correctly decide that I am not free to decide.
October 29th, 2003 at Oct 29, 03 | 8:00 am
‘When people argue for determinism who are they trying to persuade?’
Themselves.
However, as you point out it is in vain.
October 29th, 2003 at Oct 29, 03 | 9:11 pm
The problem I have with the concept of “free will” is that from my point of view the concept is incoherent. And although I have asked many, many individuals no one who believes that they possess it has ever been able to articulate exactly what they mean by it, or why I should believe that “free will” exist?
Now Determinism (otherwise known as Fate, or Destiny) is a very easy concept to comprehend. It can be defined as the notion that all events are preordained, which is analogous to saying that ALL events have an underlying logical (comprehensible (non-contradictory)) cause. In other words, things do not happen randomly and magically (supernaturally) and without reason. All events have a cause.
BTW: I would say that dismissing determinism axiomatically (as per Rand) is analogous to dismissing physics/science axiomatically.
The behavior of matter/energy (i.e. atoms) is completely controlled by the laws of physics.
Your physical brain (and physical body) is (are) made entirely of matter/energy (i.e. atoms).
Ergo, all of your thoughts, behavior, and actions are completely and ultimately controlled by the laws of physics.
October 29th, 2003 at Oct 29, 03 | 9:30 pm
Who do you expect to buy this argument, and how?
October 29th, 2003 at Oct 29, 03 | 9:57 pm
I’m not sure I understand your comment?
If you are asserting the existence of “free will” then you are the one who should be able to define it, and explain what you mean by it.
Or are you claiming that “free will” is something that ALL people should intuitively comprehend and accept on blind faith alone? … Kind of like “God”?
October 29th, 2003 at Oct 29, 03 | 10:07 pm
Blorgmpowmelsdfkw.
Lownmetr2234.;
October 29th, 2003 at Oct 29, 03 | 10:09 pm
Sorry, control re-established. The photons leaving my CRT’s phosphors, displaying The Serpent’s post, excited photoreceptors in my eyes, and through a complex chain of chemical reactions and electrical impulses caused the muscles in my arms and hands to post that response.
October 29th, 2003 at Oct 29, 03 | 10:15 pm
Like I was saying … no one who professes a belief in “free will” seems to be able to articulate precisely what they mean.
October 29th, 2003 at Oct 29, 03 | 10:29 pm
Free will is simply the ability of what I think of as my self to choose things. I can choose to make this post, or another post of random characters, or not to respond at all. If you can’t define it, how can you argue against it?
When you fall back on physics to discredit the idea, my response is, in what sort of universe would you admit that free will (however you define it) is not an illusion? Personally, I can only imagine three categories of physical laws: causality/determinism, probability, and randomness. A universe can contain laws of each type, but each individual law must fall into one category or another.
October 29th, 2003 at Oct 29, 03 | 11:11 pm
Andy Stedman: [Free will is simply the ability of what I think of as my self to choose things.]
Serpent: You mean kind of like a “Soul”?
Stedman: [I can choose to make this post, or another post of random characters, or not to respond at all.]
Serpent: Actually if you are a “Materialist”, I don’t see how you could come to any other conclusion than your “choice” to post being the inevitable result of the laws of physics and atoms doing precisely what atoms do.
Can you explain why you possess more “free will” than the Moon does?
Stedman:[If you can’t define it (“free will”), how can you argue against it?]
Serpent: If you can’t define it (“God”), how can you argue against it?
Stedman: [When you fall back on physics to discredit the idea, my response is, in what sort of universe would you admit that free will (however you define it) is not an illusion?]
Serpent: Part of the reason I am a Fatalist is that I CANNOT define “free will” in a logically consistent (non-self-contradicting) fashion. The only possible circumstances under which I could see anything like “free will” as possible is if Solipsism were true and the person reading this post is the only entity to exist in reality. Of course that would mean that myself and everything else you have ever perceived are merely figments of your “subconscious” imagination.
… but you would probably have something that could genuinely be called Free Will under those circumstances.
Stedman: [Personally, I can only imagine three categories of physical laws: causality/determinism, probability, and randomness. A universe can contain laws of each type, but each individual law must fall into one category or another.]
I’m not sure what you are trying to say here? How can a law be “random”? Either a law is logically consistent or it is not, and if it is logically consistent than I don’t see how it could be described as random?
As for “probability”, that is what you get when you do not fully comprehend the underlying mechanism (logical process) of the law.
As I stated previously, Determinism is the notion that all things have an underlying logical mechanism (cause). To assume otherwise is analogous to claiming that some events occur without any cause (i.e. random/magical/supernatural) which of course would violate the fundamental notion of “reality”.
How often do you perceive a red traffic light at a busy intersection and randomly and uncontrollably run that red light without cause?
October 29th, 2003 at Oct 29, 03 | 11:28 pm
The Serpent: Part of the reason I am a Fatalist is that I CANNOT define “free will” in a logically consistent (non-self-contradicting) fashion.
What do you mean by “…the reason I am a…”? Did you choose to be a Fatalist? According to you, that is meaningless.
The Serpent: As for “probability”, that is what you get when you do not fully comprehend the underlying mechanism (logical process) of the law.
Most physicists believe that Quantum Mechanics is genuinely probablistic in nature. Do you have some hidden insight to the universe, are you smarter than them, or is this belief based on faith that the universe must be deterministic?
Do you believe in consciousness? If so, what does it mean to be conscious but unable to make choices?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 12:00 am
Andy,
I make “choices” in the same way that a computer program makes “choices” – algorithmically.
Stedman: [What do you mean by “…the reason I am a Fatalist”? Did you choose to be a Fatalist? According to you, that is meaningless.]
Exactly correct. Like all events in my existence I was DESTINED to become a Fatalist. Perhaps it is your destiny as well?
Stedman: [(on probability …) Most physicists believe that Quantum Mechanics is genuinely probablistic in nature.]
Actually this is a common misconception. I assume you are referring to the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle which states that BOTH the position and velocity of a particle cannot be precisely know simultaneously? The fact is that Heisenberg (and others) only stated that you cannot KNOW both values, they NEVER stated that there was no underlying mechanic, only that such a mechanism cannot be observed.
In fact, recent experiments utilizing images of particle collisions reveal that you can determine BOTH the position and velocity of particles (in the past) with limits far, far below what Heisenberg claimed was possible. Heisenberg only proved that present technology prohibits humans from gaining the power of omniscience.
But as to the nature of Quantum Mechanics, Einstein said it best – “The Goddess does not play dice with the Universe!”
Stedman: [Do you believe in consciousness?]
I believe in “consciousness”, but then again, I am not a devotee to the religion of Materialism. Under the philosophy of Materialism I don’t see how one could maintain logical consistency without coming to the ultimate conclusion that “consciousness” must ultimately be regarded as an illusion.
Stedman: [What does it mean to be conscious but unable to make choices?]
I would say that if you can achieve your purpose for existence without “free will” then “free will” is irrelevant (if not detrimental) to your existence. The notion of “free will” is superfluous to my worldview; ergo parsimony (Occam’s razor) demands that it be eliminated from the theory.
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 12:41 am
Hey, I should also make the point (to Sabotta or Kennedy – I can’t remember which) that the inherent flaw in the foundational premise of Materialism (i.e. matter exists inherently and independent of observation) is also the root of the problem you were having trying to articulate your reasoning for intellectual property rights.
The fact of the matter is that ALL property is a form of intellectual property. What “we” normally consider “Material property” is, in effect, the intellectual property (creation of) of a single (specific unique individual) consciousness.
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 2:51 am
Serpent,
I think my question is simple enough: Who do you expect to buy that argument and how would they do so?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 3:14 am
Aaron???
Where the hell are you hanging out man?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 11:26 am
The purpose of this post is merely to point out the most obvious inconsistencies in the arguments of The Serpent.
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The Serpent: [The problem I have with the concept of “free will” is that from my point of view the concept is incoherent … Determinism (otherwise known as Fate, or Destiny) is a very easy concept to comprehend.]
Argument from personal comprehension is hardly solid logical ground for convincing others, assuming The Serpent is not merely attempting to convince himself.
__________________________________
The Serpent: [I would say that dismissing determinism axiomatically (as per Rand) is analogous to dismissing physics/science axiomatically.]
I would agree. However, the very next statement in this post is also equivalent to the same; The Serpent posits a normative statement about the valid application of physics.
The Serpent: [The behavior of matter/energy (i.e. atoms) is completely controlled by the laws of physics.]
And uses this (along with a premise from within the field of physics) to reach a similar meta-conclusion about physics, below.
The Serpent: [Ergo, all of your thoughts, behavior, and actions are completely and ultimately controlled by the laws of physics.]
__________________________________
The Serpent: [As for “probability”, that is what you get when you do not fully comprehend the underlying mechanism (logical process) of the law.]
This relates to the earlier inconsistency. The Serpent’s argument against Rand’s affirmation of free will rests on the premise that science is to be trusted over axiomatic denials. However, he simply denies the validity of the entire branch of science dealing with probability on the grounds of the axiom that uncertainty does not exist inherently in natural phenomena (and thus therefore must be a failing of the observer). Not only is this argument inconsistent as demonstrated, but it begs the question; the premise of a lack of uncertainty is used to further an argument for determinism.
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 12:08 pm
‘Aaron???
Where the hell are you hanging out man?’
Here, mostly, but also over at shonk’s place. Also been playin a lot of videa games.
Anyway to the topic at hand. As to the debate between libertarianism (metaphysical not political) and determinism, as well as what a libertarian means, or might mean, when speaking of free will. For the moment I will limit my discussion to hard determinism, which I believe The Serpent is proposing, rather than soft determinism (or compatiblism), this is not to say that some of the things I will say with regard to determinism would not equally apply to compatiblism, but to keep the discussion as brief as possible, I would rather not cover unnecessary ground. I don’t suppose that defining determinism is necessary, however as The Serpent seems to insist on definitions of all terms involved, I will provide one. Determinism, basically, is the view that happens, its happening was necessitated factors, such that given these prior factors, the event must have occurred. Put another way, the determinist believe that any event E, with prior cause(s) C, assuming all else equal, C must always and necessarily lead to E. Here the determinist makes two assumptions, the first, that this applies to all what we will call agents, this assumption is a direct conflict with the libertarian, and second that causality is necessary rather than probabilistic, this assumption does not necessarily come into direct conflict with the libertarian, however it may. We shall return to both of these in a minute.
Now to the definition of libertarianism, and of course free will, which The Serpent has continued on about. Libertarianism, again understood metaphysically and not politically, is the view than an agent has a certain control over his actions, such that given a choice between A and B, not besides the agent determines which is made, that is if the agent was free to choose A the agent was also free to choose B. The agent, himself, is choosing (freely) to exercise his causal powers, or will, to do one or the other, hence free will. Again, this is to say, that all else being equal, an agent S could choose to act in manner A or manner B (B being not A), regardless of prior states, understood here as C. In libertarianism, an agent is understood to be the first cause of a series of events. As an example, perhaps an unpopular one here, suppose a person, or agent, (S) freely performed some act, such as raising an arm to vote (A). A precise characterization of this would be:
1. S is an agent that has the power to bring about A.
2. S exerted his power as first cause of a series (or initiator of change) to bring about A.
3. S had the ability to refrain from exerting its power to bring about A.
4. S brought about A for some reason R.
I think, this R, along with a different but similar R, is the reason for some of the determinist’s misunderstandings. Libertarians do not suggest that there are not prior influences which have a probable effect of an agent choosing A as opposed to B, only that the choosing of A was not necessarily determined by these prior influences. That is to say that an agent might be more inclined to choose A instead of B, however it is not to say that the agent must necessarily choose A. Here the difference between libertarians and determinists is, I believe, most evident. The determinist suggests that those preceding causes (or influences) lead necessarily to the choosing of A, such that, with those same preceding causes, B could not have been chosen. The libertarian will readily admit that those preceding events will, in most cases, have some degree of influence over the choosing of A, but that they were not necessary, and further that in most cases there will be preceding events that would lead to B within a degree of A. Here we have the concept of deliberation. When there is, or seems to be, a conflict between the influences to such an extent that the influences for A are about equal (or within a reasonable degree) to those of B, the agent deliberates and makes a choice between A and B. This is one of the best instances of the agent as first cause of a series, however the agent as first cause applies to all free actions. Another important point here, is that the libertarian does not suggest that given certain prior events or states, the probability of the agent’s choice among alternatives is equal. That is, given certain states it might be most probable that an agent choose A, second most probable that B, third that C, etc, but unlikely that X, Y or Z. However, while X, Y, and Z and unlikely that is not to say that there are impossible or that the agent will never choose those. The situation that the agent choose Z, although radically different from the above example, similarly exemplifies the agent acting as first cause of a series, and presents a problem for determinism. So, basically, what the determinist understands as a necessary cause, the libertarian understands as at best an influence, that will only probably lead to a certain event.
The second of the determinist’s misunderstanding on R, is that of a goal. That is, not only was the agent’s choice of A probably influenced by some prior events, or was brought about by some reasons, but it was brought about by the agent for a reason, or a goal. The agent, as the first cause of a series, brought about A, in order to reach some goal. S raises his hand in order to vote (the goal). The idea of a goal, being foreign to determinism, present another problem for the determinist (I will deal with this again in direct response to The Serpent’s arguments). Here, also, the determinist confuses efficient causes (that by the means of which) with the final cause (that for the sake of). Put another way, the efficient cause is the how (the muscles moving in such a way to raise the arm, the arm being spotted and counted, etc.) with the why (in order to vote). The determinist will explain an action only by the efficient causes, or the hows, again with the example a determinist might say, S had the desire or want to vote, S had the belief that raising his hand would fulfill that desire, various physiological processes took place, the hand was spotted, etc. But this does not explain the first why, that is the final cause. Why did S have the desire or want to vote? The libertarian will say that S could have had the desire not to vote as well. The why then is explained as a final cause, the goal.
It seems, at this point, that brevity is no longer a factor, however time is, so I shall attempt to move this along faster. Now combining the idea of the final cause with the idea of the first cause, I think we can make a few things clearer. Imagine, if you will, we have nine stationary cars lined up bumper to bumper, and a tenth comes a long and hits the first car, causing each car in the series to move. The question then is what made the last or ninth car, move. If we say the eighth car then we are speaking in terms of instrumental causes, but if we say the tenth car (that is the car that hit the first car in the series) then we are speaking in terms of the first cause. The determinist sees the person as the instrumental cause, that is the cars two through eight, but the libertarian sees the person as the first cause, or car ten. The person then is the first cause in a series. This is, of course, not the best analogy, as the determinist will be quick to point out, seeing as how the movement of the tenth car was caused, however for our purposes it will suffice. The analogy was not meant to be traced as far back as possible, but merely as an analogy. Given a series involving a person, the determinist will say that the causes passed through the person, the libertarian will say that they originated with the person.
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 12:09 pm
Earlier, I mentioned that the determinist makes two assumptions, I suppose now would be a good time to deal with the second. As I mentioned this does not deal directly with libertarianism, as some libertarians agree with this assumption and others disagree. The assumption is that causes are necessary rather than probabilistic. The determinist might charge that what I am about to say applies equally to the libertarian as it does to the determinist, but this is simply not true. Libertarianism could be true whether causes are necessary or probabilistic, determinism could not. Therefore it is relevant to determinism but not to libertarianism. The determinist position rests on the assumption that given prior cause(s) C, exactly and only event E will result. This depends on an understanding of causes as necessary. However, supposing causes to be probabilistic, given prior cause(s) C, event E1 will result within a degree of event E, depending on the probability of C. This is a more graded look at causation, that is to say, that if we imagine a cause C with a degree of 90 (rather than 100 as determinists insist all causes must be) event E1 will result within a degree of 90(%) of E. This point is important because the determinist will often site science as proof of determinism. However, anyone how has conducted even the most basic scientific experiment will realize that rarely if ever do cause(s) C result within a degree of 100 of event E. The determinist will usually reply one of two things, that this view implies simple indeterminism (that is that events are random and uncaused) or that the reason that the degree of less that 100 for event E was that there were minor cause(s) c1, c2, etc. that we were unaware of. The first response is incorrect, the view that if causes are probable then there are no causes, but this this is not an acceptable conclusion, the fact of causes were affirmed in the antecedent. The second response could be true, but is pure conjecture.
A few more points could be made based on the determinist’s use of science as evidence of determinism. The scientific method is based on scientific induction, that is if we observe a thing happening under certain conditions enough, we can assume its dependency on those conditions. Put more accurately, scientific induction takes this form (although, as I will address later, the use of logical terms in the area of causation is mistaken, I will use them to better explain):
P1. Under certain conditions, and all else being equal, if A1 then B1
P2. Under certain conditions, and all else being equal, if A2 then B2
P3. Under certain conditions, and all else being equal, if A3 then B3
…
C#. Therefore, Under certain conditions, and all else being equal, if A then B
As an example, suppose I have a golf ball in my hand, and I let go, I see that it drops. I do this a second time and a third, until I get tired of it. If each time it drops then I assume that if I have a golf ball in my hand and I let it go then it will drop. Or, the golf ball dropped because I let it go (the cause was letting go, the effect it dropping). Scientific induction says that if something happens 1000 times, then it will happen 1001. The determinist applies this to persons, or agents, and says if cause(s) C resulted in event E 1000 times, then it will happen 1001 times. But this is exactly what is being argued, and here I think we see where the determinist’s argument from science breaks down. With things (that is natural, mechanical objects) of course what has happened 1000 times will happen 1001 and one times, there is nothing in the thing to prevent it from happening, the thing has no free will. But with humans, who the libertarian says have free will, that a thing happened 1000 times does not mean that it will necessarily happen 1001 times. In fact, most humans agree with this. Suppose we change up my experiment by adding in a human factor. If I have a golf ball in my hand and my little brother is sitting nearby, I drop the golf ball 1000 times, and it falls to the ground. But one the 1001st time, my brother catches it. Certainly if scientific induction applied to human agents, then the 1001st time would have been just like the first 1000. But when a human agent is added to the equation, that changes, and so scientific induction does not apply (or does not apply to a degree of reasonably high probability).
Since the determinist relies so much on science to prove his point, I suppose I should mention one more objection to his use of it. The determinist (usually) thinks of scientific laws as prescriptive, instead of descriptive. But I don’t see that as being the case, and scientific induction (being as it is induction) would agrue in my favor. Scientific laws do not say (or legislate) what must happen, rather they describe what does happen. That is scientific laws do not control the world, rather they are generalizations about the world. Does this view invalidate science? By no means, rather it is necessary in order for science to work. If scientific laws were prescriptive, then the scientific method would be invalidated.
Another problem with determinist, somewhat related to JTK’s objection, is that it provides no rational basis for thought. At this point I will borrow and adapt an analogy by Richard Taylor. Suppose you were on a train in the british isles, looking out the window, you see white stones on a hillside reading ‘The British Railways welcomes you to Wales.’ Now you could explain this in one of two ways, through efficient causes or through final causes. If you chose to explain it through efficient causes then you might suppose that overtime these rocks rolled there due and formed this sentence, without reference to a person. Or you could assume, though a final cause, that some person or persons moved these stones to send a message. Now suppose you accept this statement as truth, if you chose the latter then you would have a rational basis for accepting that conclusion, namely that someone was trying to welcome you to Wales. If however you accept the message, but chose the former, then you would have no rational basis for accepting the truth. That is if it was not meant to convey the truth, let alone anything at all, then why accept it as doing such. The determinist, in explaining thought and everything else, through efficient causes and denying final causes, does the same as the person who accepts the message but denies that it had a purpose. That is the determinist accepts the thought, even though since the thought was determined only by prior causes and not with a goal, has no rational basis for the thought. So a determinist must hold that he accepts determinism only because prior causes necessitated that he did, and not because it is true. And since there is no rational basis for this position, there is no reason that the determinist, or anyone else, should accept it.
I had planned to say more, a lot more, but as it is late, I will have to conclude here. Tomorrow, or soon afterward, I will post again with some more thoughts on determinism and libertarianism as well as some responses to what The Serpent said. But, as I hope this covers the basis and since I am falling asleep, this will have to do for now. Anything that I said I would cover, but haven’t yet, will be covered with my next post, as well as a lot more. But for now, this is it.
Sorry I had to break it up, they told me I was only allowed a certain number of characters (with spaces) per comment.
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 5:49 pm
Wow … I see a lot of hand waving (which is exactly what I anticipated), but I don’t see where anyone who professes a belief in “free will” has actually bothered to define the term. Nor do I perceive where anyone here has provided any straight-forward answers to my straight-forward questions.
I suppose “free will” is just a too complex a subject for the layman to comprehend without a heap of Faith and the divinely inspired guidance of a Priest of Materialism. As for myself, I lack-a-belief in the religion of Materialism. I am an Amatertialist (you know … like an Atheist).
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 5:50 pm
“Here, mostly, but also over at shonk’s place.”
shonk’s place is shonkadelic.
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 6:05 pm
“I suppose “free will” is just a too complex a subject for the layman to comprehend without a heap of Faith and the divinely inspired guidance of a Priest of Materialism.”
How is a determined being to comprehend anything?
What is the point of chiding a determined being? Under determinism this is like one rock saying to another “I guess everything I say is going right over your head….”
Knowing as you do that we cannot be other than as we are isn’t it amusing that you think we ought to do better?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 6:26 pm
John Kennedy: [How is a determined being to comprehend anything?]
What makes you assume that Determinism and comprehension are incompatible? Determinism and Logic are two sides of the same coin. Or put another way, if you cannot determine anything than how are you able to comprehend anything?
John Kennedy: [What is the point of chiding a determined being?]
I am not chiding, and I certainly apologize if I came off that way. I am merely here as an Observer. Whether or not my observations happen to collapse anyone’s wavefunction in the process is entirely incidental.
John Kennedy: [Knowing as you do that we cannot be other than as we are isn’t it amusing that you think we ought to do better?]
Ahhh, but if existence weren’t “amusing” then what would be the point?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 7:25 pm
Why apologize for the inevitable?
Why do you routinely imply people could be other than as they are, while you simultaneously insist they could not?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 7:58 pm
John Kennedy: [Why apologize for the inevitable?]
Because it is impossible for me to act against my inherent nature.
John Kennedy: [Why do you routinely imply people could be other than as they are, while you simultaneously insist they could not?]
Because Individuals can be other than what they are Today by Tomorrow.
It’s called evolution.
When are you going to define the term “free will”? Perhaps Lady Fate is forbidding you from defining it?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 8:07 pm
isn’t it odd that your nature would require you to apologize for no reason?
As to free will, my only point from the beginning has been to show that you cannot proceed coherently from the premise that you are determined. And clearly you do not, with everything you offer you imply that you are not determined.
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 8:09 pm
Aaron,
If I am correctly comprehending the gist of your long and complicated explanation I might summarize your view by stating that “the existence of ’Free will’ is incumbent on the existence of a random (stochastic or non-deterministic) nature to the underlying reality.
To me this is analogous to claiming that when you perceive a “red” traffic light at an unfamiliar, yet obviously busy, intersection instead of relying on your past experience with “red” traffic lights to make your “choice” of whether to stop or go, your mind essentially flips a coin and makes the determination randomly.
Suppose I pose the question to you of: “What is the sum of 2 + 2?”, and let us further assume that you are making a purchase and your correct response is imperative to you receiving the proper change. Under this situation are you honestly trying to tell me that your answer is not going to be SOLELY based on your past experience with mathematics???
Are you trying to say that in order for Determinism to be False (and “free will” to be True) that you must randomly answer the question “what is the sum of 2 + 2”?
I am betting you NEVER answer that question randomly and your response is ALWAYS based on past experience. If I am wrong, or if I have misinterpreted your post could you please elaborate and/or explain my error?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 8:14 pm
John Kennedy: [isn’t it odd that your nature would require you to apologize for no reason?]
Who said there was no reason? I told you the reason. Perhaps you cannot accept it because it conflicts with your deeply held religious beliefs (i.e. Rand is an infallible Saint, “free will” exist and there is no “God”).
John Kennedy: [As to free will, my only point from the beginning has been to show that you cannot proceed coherently from the premise that you are determined. And clearly you do not, with everything you offer you imply that you are not determined.]
Perhaps your worldview is altering your perception of reality?
Why are you unable/unwilling to define the very concept which you keep assuring me definitely exist? (i.e. “free will”)
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 9:43 pm
The Serpent: Why are you unable/unwilling to define the very concept which you keep assuring me definitely exist? (i.e. “free will”)
What do you mean, “unwilling”? It’s not like he has a choice of whether or not to provide you with a definition. Right?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 10:33 pm
Andy,
Should I take your last post as a concession?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 10:34 pm
“Why are you unable/unwilling to define the very concept which you keep assuring me definitely exist? (i.e. “free will”) “
Read more carefully, at no point have I assured you that free will definitely exists. I have pointed out that you cannot coherently proceed from the premise that you are determined. As Andy points out you continue to demonstrate my point at every turn.
I wrote: “But I know that I cannot be free to correctly decide that I am not free to decide.”
Do you suppose I am free to to decide that I’m not free to decide? If not, who are you attepting to persuade?
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 10:49 pm
The Serpent: Should I take your last post as a concession?
No. But, why ask? And, what is concession, if not choosing to agree.
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 10:57 pm
John Kennedy: [Read more carefully, at no point have I assured you that free will definitely exists.]
Ahh, so you are now claiming Agnosticism in regard to the issue of “free will”/Determinism?
John Kennedy: [I have pointed out that you cannot coherently proceed from the premise that you are determined.]
No — you can ONLY proceed coherently from the premise that you (events) are determined. To claim otherwise is assume an incoherent (i.e. supernatural/magical) premise (or mechanism) for actions (and events).
Keep in mind I am not saying that you don’t make “choices”, I am only asserting that those “choices” are made algorithmically (i.e. with an underlying logical process). If you prefer a comfortable delusion to an unfamiliar reality than that is certainly your “choice”. For me personally (assuming I actually exist) I am only interested in the reason WHY you made that “choice”.
Up to this point I can only speculate as to that reason based on the available evidence.
John Kennedy: [Do you suppose I am free to decide that I’m not free to decide? If not, who are you attempting to persuade?]
I’m not attempting to persuade anyone. Whether you will be “persuaded” or not was already determined long, long ago. Now it is simply a matter for us to observe the inevitable result.
Did you use your “free will” to choose who your parents would be? What language you would speak? Where and when you would be raised? I would say that those events have far more to do with who you are today than any imaginary “choices” you believe you have made.
October 30th, 2003 at Oct 30, 03 | 11:06 pm
Andy Stedman: [what is concession, if not choosing to agree.]
Concession = the acknowledgment (expression of information) that a previous conclusion (perception or observation) was in error
Where “Errors” are the result of 1) incomplete information. 2) basing a conclusion on inconsistent (contradictory) logic or 3) basing a conclusion on a faulty perception (observation)
A “faulty perception” is based on an inconsistent worldview (i.e. once a premise is flawed any subsequent conclusion drawn from that premise will inevitably be flawed in some way)
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 6:45 pm
Saber … I wonder if that was what we once called you?
It was not so long ago (relative to you) that I witnessed your graviton negatively entangled (”engaged in combat”) with the graviton of one of my most ancient foes.
At that instant I recognized you as an entity who in the distant past called me brother. But my master … She doubted you could be saved in this universe. Like myself you are Soldato. But even She concedes that I have a knack for these kind of things, so I was able to prevail upon Her to let me come down here and see for myself. Cause and effect – the one constant in reality.
——————————-
I certainly don’t mean to offend anyone here, and causing distress (or harm) to anyone in this forum is the last thing on my mind. My goal is — in fact — the exact opposite.
But allow me to try one last approach.
Fatalism is the notion that there are always, Always, ALWAYS consequences for ones actions (positive and negative reinforcement). You may not experience those consequences immediately, but eventually and inevitably they return to their source magnified over time (a.k.a. Karma).
The best definition I have ever heard for “free will” is a rejection of this belief. In other words, “free will” is the rejection of the idea that there are consequences for ones actions. Once this belief (meme or algorithm) takes hold in a conscious mind its propagation is relentless if left unchecked. Eventually the consciousness may even come to the conclusion that one day he will “cease to exist” thus making a final escape for all times from the consequences of his actions.
And an entity that believes there are No ultimate consequences for his actions tends to behave EXACTLY as if that is what he believes.
Our prisons are full of Men who believed they possessed “free will”.
Undoubtedly the notion of Fate is disconcerting at first, and one can initially be very uncomfortable with it. But I assure you that discomfort is merely the result of a faulty perception. The truth of Destiny only alters your existence for the better. In reality – the Truth is always ultimately beneficial. It is only a matter of perceiving that benefit.
Put another way you may perceive that “free will” is an optimistic philosophy, whereas Fatalism might appear as a direly pessimistic one. I can assure you that ultimately the opposite is true. Without Fate there is no Individuality, and Individuality is far more precious and valuable than the Solipsism, which by necessity, accompanies “free will”.
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 6:50 pm
“I certainly don’t mean to offend anyone here, and causing distress (or harm) to anyone in this forum is the last thing on my mind. My goal is — in fact — the exact opposite. “
Are you free to pursue your goals?
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 6:52 pm
Got it. You’re not arguing against free will, you’re arguing against wishful thinking.
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 7:57 pm
John Kennedy: Are you free to pursue your goals?
I am compelled (i.e. destined) to pursue my goals, as are ALL individuals.
Andy Stedman: Got it. You’re not arguing against free will, you’re arguing against wishful thinking.
When you believe that you possess “free will” yet you are unable to define it or articulate precisely what you mean, that epitomizes wishful thinking.
But please, don’t allow what I have actually said to stand in the way of your fantasies and delusions about what I have said.
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 8:45 pm
“But please, don’t allow what I have actually said to stand in the way of your fantasies and delusions about what I have said. “
Why do you speak as if he were free to be other than as he is?
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 9:05 pm
John Kennedy: Why do you speak as if he were free to be other than as he is?
Why do you assume that I am “free” to say anything else?
Perhaps Mr. Stedman is destined to become a Fatalist? And perhaps I am to be part of the cause (i.e. agent) for that apparent alteration in the path of his Worldline? Then again, perhaps the person reading this post is the only entity that actually exist, and they are simply trying to sort things out in their own mind?
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 9:22 pm
Why do you speak as if one would be free to sort things out in one’s own mind?
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 9:34 pm
John Kennedy: Why do you speak as if one would be free to sort things out in one’s own mind?
Well if Solipsism were true then there would be no external influences. Everything you perceived would be a product of your own making (your own imagination). Without any real external influences the Solipsist would possess true Free Will.
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 10:16 pm
You keep saying that I haven’t defined free will, yet I have. If there’s something you don’t like about my definition, please articulate it. See the 8th response above.
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 10:46 pm
Andy Stedman (previously): Free will is simply the ability of what I think of as my self to choose things. I can choose to make this post, or another post of random characters, or not to respond at all.
To which I responded: Actually if you are a “Materialist”, I don’t see how you could come to any other conclusion than your “choice” to post being the inevitable result of the laws of physics and atoms doing precisely what atoms do.
Can you explain why you possess more “free will” than the Moon does?
It seems to me that all you have done is shift the topic of debate from the term “free will” to the term “choice”. I am not arguing that you do not make “choices”, I am arguing that the existence of “free will” is incumbent on the manner in which those “choices” are made.
Allow me to use your own words to illustrate this point.
“Free will” is simply the ability of a computer program to “choose” between available options. The program can choose to make this response, or another response of “randomly” generated characters, or not to respond at all.
Now are you asserting that computer programs have also “free will”? If not, than can you specifically articulate why you believe you possess “free will”, but other entities/agents that make “choices” do not have “free will”?
I fail to see how anyone calling themselves a “Materialist” could come to the conclusion that they have any more “free will” than the Moon does since BOTH You and the Moon are made entirely of Atoms (“matter”) and nothing else? Under Materialism the main difference between you and the Moon is that You have a slightly more complex orbit (pattern of movement).
October 31st, 2003 at Oct 31, 03 | 10:55 pm
“Allow me to use your own words to illustrate this point.”
Huh? Where did he say that? If you’re citing something off the thread it would be nice to provide a link.
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 5:51 pm
John,
Here is what Andy said originally:
Andy Stedman (previously): Free will is simply the ability of what I think of as my self to choose things. I can choose to make this post, or another post of random characters, or not to respond at all.
And here is my paraphrasing of his words:
“Free will” is simply the ability of a computer program to “choose” between available options. The program can choose to make this response, or another response of “randomly” generated characters, or not to respond at all.
My point being, if the advocates of “free will” are claiming that consciousness DOES NOT function in a manner analogous to a computer program (i.e. algorithmically) then what precisely are they claiming?
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 6:26 pm
Do you know that you are a computer program? I don’t. And what do you mean analogous? If you are a program running on a biological Turing Machine then there is no analogy. For some purposes I may consider consciousness analogous to a program running on a Turing Machine, but that doesn’t mean I identify them as the same thing.
I don’t know. I can’t explain how a program could generate the *experience* of me, can you?
What precisely am I claiming? I’ve been clear all along. I’m claiming you cannot proceed coherently from the premise that you’re determined. You seem to think I need to provide an explanation for free will to support this, but my argument does not rely on any such explanation.
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 6:49 pm
John Kennedy: Do you know that you are a computer program? I don’t.
So you can’t explain what you DO believe, nor can you explain specifically where you disagree with me, but I am in error (according to you) none-the-less?
John Kennedy: And what do you mean analogous? If you are a program running on a biological Turing Machine then there is no analogy. For some purposes I may consider consciousness analogous to a program running on a Turing Machine, but that doesn’t mean I identify them as the same thing.
Okay, so if you are saying there is a difference, then what is the specific difference???
John Kennedy: I don’t know. I can’t explain how a program could generate the *experience* of me, can you?
Sure. And I will be more than happy to explain it, just as soon as you provide the baseline and explain how a “non-program” can generate the *experience* of being you?
John Kennedy: What precisely am I claiming? I’ve been clear all along. I’m claiming you cannot proceed coherently from the premise that you’re determined.
And I have repeatedly asked you to elaborate and explain what you are talking about. It would seem (from my perspective) that you have it backwards and you cannot proceed coherently if you start off by assuming that the process is NOT deterministic. What does it mean for your thoughts and behavior to be non-deterministic? Isn’t that the same as claiming your thoughts and actions are fundamentally magical and intrinsically incoherent? Your claim seems to be that only by assuming that action (the “Will”, or consciousness) is fundamentally incoherent can you proceed coherently. That does make any sense to me.
How is what you are claiming any different? So far you have not addressed this point.
John Kennedy:You seem to think I need to provide an explanation for free will to support this, but my argument does not rely on any such explanation.
Well as I stated at the onset, it would seem that a belief in “free will” is based solely on Faith, and dogma. Essentially it sounds like you are saying that “free will” requires no explanation. You just accept it as divine gospel truth, or you do not.
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 7:31 pm
No I’m saying you cannot coherently proceed from the premise that you are determined.
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 7:36 pm
“Sure. And I will be more than happy to explain it, just as soon as you provide the baseline and explain how a “non-program” can generate the *experience* of being you? “
I cannot explain it at all. Can you?
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 7:58 pm
John Kennedy: No I’m saying you cannot coherently proceed from the premise that you are determined.
Why not?
Elaborate.
Explain why you believe that Determinism (Fatalism) is logically incoherent?
Serpent (Previously): <b> “… I will be more than happy to explain it, just as soon as you provide the baseline and explain how a “non-program” can generate the *experience* of being you? ”
John Replied: <I>I cannot explain it at all. Can you?
I can explain it, but not to an individual who is determined to axiomatically reject any argument I present without explaining why said argument is being rejected.
What do you know about Thomas Bayes?
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 8:11 pm
“I can explain it, but not to an individual who is determined to axiomatically reject any argument I present without explaining why said argument is being rejected. “
You want me as a determined being to be more receptive to your argument? How would you suggest I do that?
In any case don’t worry about me, explain it for those who may understand.
“What do you know about Thomas Bayes?”
Not much. Bayes Theorem is probability theorem.
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 8:22 pm
John Kennedy: You want me as a determined being to be more receptive to your argument? How would you suggest I do that?
No, not at all. I am merely stating that unless you are willing to articulate WHY you disagree, I am unable to comprehend WHY you disagree.
John Kennedy: Not much. Bayes Theorem is probability theorem.
Bayes is the guy who mathematically proved that as you receive more information about an apparently “random” system it ceases to be “random” (incomprehensible). But that is a tangent we should probably avoid for the moment.
In any event, I still am no closer to understanding why you believe that Determinism is incompatible with reality (inherently incoherent?). And you don’t seem to be in any rush to explain your own thoughts and views on the matter.
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 9:01 pm
“No, not at all.”
Then explain how a program could generate the experience of me, as you said you could.
“In any event, I still am no closer to understanding why you believe that Determinism is incompatible with reality (inherently incoherent?).”
I didn’t say that, I said you cannot proceed coherently from the premise that you are determined.
Non-existence of you might not contradict reality, but you cannot cannot coherently proceed from the premise that you don’t exist.
You *might* not exist but any argument you care to offer against your existence impies you do exist, just as any argument you offer to show that you are determined implies that you are not.
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 9:26 pm
John Kennedy: Then explain how a program could generate the experience of me, as you said you could.
That is precisely what I have been doing. But you keep rejecting those arguments without providing any logical reason as to why you reject them.
John Kennedy: I didn’t say that, I said you cannot proceed coherently from the premise that you are determined.
Why not?
John Kennedy: Non-existence of you might not contradict reality, but you cannot coherently proceed from the premise that you don’t exist.
Hehehe … you should try telling that to the Materialist, because that is EXACTLY what they are asserting. But I don’t see how this relates to “me”, or my argument for Determinism (Fatalism).
John Kennedy: You *might* not exist but any argument you care to offer against your existence impies you do exist, just as any argument you offer to show that you are determined implies that you are not.
Perhaps I’m missing something, but your argument seems rather circular.
JK: any argument you offer to show that you are determined implies that you are not
So essentially you have decided (determined) that you have “free will”, and there is no way for anyone to prove you wrong. No argument will convince you otherwise.
Reminds me of fundamentalist Christianity.
November 3rd, 2003 at Nov 03, 03 | 11:45 pm
“Perhaps I’m missing something,…”
That’s right.
November 5th, 2003 at Nov 05, 03 | 3:25 pm
Yet you are still unable or unwilling to articulate precisely what it is that you obviously believe I am “missing”.
Eight days ago I said:
The problem I have with the concept of “free will” is that from my point of view the concept is incoherent. And although I have asked many, many individuals no one who believes that they possess it has ever been able to articulate exactly what they mean by it, or why I should believe that “free will” exist?
On hindsight those words are seeming more and more prophetic.
November 5th, 2003 at Nov 05, 03 | 4:13 pm
As I see this thread is slipping from view I will leave you with a few words from a man I consider my brother — a man, who I am told, you consider a friend in purpose.
- Fix reason firmly in Her seat, and call on Her tribunal for every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, She must more approve of the homage of reason than that of blindfolded fear.
- He who knows nothing is closer to the truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehoods and errors.
- Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are of the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with His wrath? Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that His justice cannot sleep forever.
Do you know this man, or these words Mr. Kennedy?
November 5th, 2003 at Nov 05, 03 | 6:50 pm
“On hindsight those words are seeming more and more prophetic. “
Again: I’m claiming you cannot proceed coherently from the premise that you’re determined. You seem to think I need to provide an explanation for free will to support this, but my argument does not rely on any such explanation.
November 5th, 2003 at Nov 05, 03 | 6:59 pm
“Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are of the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with His wrath? Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that His justice cannot sleep forever.”
In a determined universe? Or was your comment a non sequitur?
“Do you know this man, or these words Mr. Kennedy?”
Jefferson.
November 5th, 2003 at Nov 05, 03 | 9:27 pm
John Kennedy: Again: I’m claiming you cannot proceed coherently from the premise that you’re determined. You seem to think I need to provide an explanation for free will to support this, but my argument does not rely on any such explanation.
Well this is precisely where you are losing me.
It seems that you are saying any argument for the existence of “free will” makes the case that “free will” exists.
Whereas any argument against the existence of “free will’ is either A] fundamentally incoherent, or B] actually an argument against “free will”.
Like I said that is circular logic. According to you there is no null hypothesis for “free will”. That relinquishes the notion of “free will” (and any conclusion based on that notion) from the sphere of science and logic, and to the realm of dogmatic acceptance based on blind faith and blind faith alone.
John Kennedy: In a determined universe? Or was your comment a non sequitur?
How was it a non-sequitur? (non-sequitur = it does not follow = the conclusion does not flow from the premises)
Can liberties be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction that these liberties are the gift of God (i.e. liberties are the result of “God’s” will (not ours))? That they are not to be violated (violated = a negative action) but with His wrath (wrath = punishment (a negative reinforcement)
Equal and opposite reaction. Cause and effect. Karma. I suppose Jefferson is actually talking about our “free will” here and how we can do what we please because there is no Fate to worry about?
November 5th, 2003 at Nov 05, 03 | 9:30 pm
oops!
My 3rd sentence above should have read:
B] actually an argument for “free will”.
But surely my error was due to the stochastic nature of quantum mechanics.
November 5th, 2003 at Nov 05, 03 | 9:47 pm
“It seems that you are saying any argument for the existence of “free will” makes the case that “free will” exists.”
I’ve said no such thing.
“Whereas any argument against the existence of “free will’ is either A] fundamentally incoherent, or B] actually an argument for “free will”.
An agrument for determinism is incoherent because if correct there would be no agency able to evaluate the argument. I cannot be free to correctly decide that I am not free to decide.
November 5th, 2003 at Nov 05, 03 | 9:58 pm
John Kennedy: An argument for determinism is incoherent because if correct there would be no agency able to evaluate the argument.
So long as the process of evaluation is also deterministic I don’t see how this would be true?
In other words, a deterministic agent eventually accumulates enough information to determine that all events are the result of logical processes.
John Kennedy: I cannot be free to correctly decide that I am not free to decide.
Why do you believe that the existence of self-awareness is incumbent on your immediate approval of the mechanism of your self-awareness?
Come on John. Surely you must realize that “non-deterministic” is analogous to “magical”.
… and you don’t strike me as a mystic.