Robin Hood Revisited
Apr 09, 04 | 12:44 am by John T. KennedyYesterday I asked consequentialists whether robbing from the rich to give to the poor was desirable based upon the principle of marginal utility. Micha Ghertner and Michael Giesbrecht held that the result was desirable. Other consequentialists held that the transfer could not be identified as desirable since the loss for the rich man could not validly be compared to the gain for the poor man. If it could be determined that a poor man valued $1000 more than Bill Gates did then presumably some of these consequentialists would approve of Robin Hood style transfers.
Can we reliably determine that one person values something more than another does? In a comment on Catallarchy I asked:
If Jonathan will pay $10 for a pear but Micha will pay no more than $9 for it, and Jonathan and Micha are indifferent to trading dollars with each other on a one-for-one basis, then can�t we safely conclude that Jonathan values the pear more than Micha does?
It sounds plausible. But if we look more closely we find that the conclusion, far from being safe, is unsupported. It’s tempting to observe that M and J are indifferent to trading dollars and assume that they value dollars equally. But wait a minute - we came down this road trying to find support for the idea that we could verify that at the margin a dollar was worth more to a poor man than it was to Bill Gates. But even if the dollar is worth more to one man than than the other we will still find that they are indifferent to trading dollars. Assuming that in context the poor man values dollars more than Gates does, both are still indifferent as to whether they end up with a dollar that’s currently in their pocket or a dollar currently in the pocket of the other man instead. But that can’t mean they value dollars equally when we’ve already stipulated they don’t.
Since indifference to trading dollars doesn’t mean individuals value dollars equally, we have not identified any valid standard by which we can compare the values of individuals. Dollars won’t do, and Jonathan Wilde correctly points out that no other commodity will will do any better as a standard for comparison.
Since we have not identified any standard by which we can reliably determine that the forced transfer of dollars benefits the poor man more than it harms Bill Gates do Micha and Michael still find the result desirable?
By what standard?
April 9th, 2004 at Apr 09, 04 | 6:20 am
JTK,
I will give a much longer response in a post on Catallarchy when I get a chance (which may be a while; I am very busy). For now, I refer you to Friedman, who addresses the issue of interpersonal comparisons of utility here.
April 9th, 2004 at Apr 09, 04 | 6:57 am
I’m quite familiar with The Machinery of Freedom, Micha. I have a copy at arm’s length. You’ve linked to the chapter where, contrary to your assertion, Friedman does indeed reject Utilitarianism as the standard of what one ought to do, and in so doing rejects consequentialism also - as I quoted.
April 9th, 2004 at Apr 09, 04 | 9:11 am
If you are going to claim that Friedman rejects consequentialism as the (ultimate) standard of what one ought to do (which is true, although I still think it is fair to call him a consequentialist), then one should also mention that Friedman rejects natural rights as the standard of what one ought to do. So what we are left with is that Friedman doesn’t appear to subscribe to either theory in its entirety, but prefers consequentialism based on a standard of usefullness.
The reason why I linked to that chapter is that he addresses the issue of interpersonal comparisons and the flaws associated with making such comparisons, yet your question to me seems to ignore the points he made. Just because we have no perfect way of making such comparisons does not mean that such comparisons should not or cannot be made. The standard of perfection is a standard that would eliminate every epistemelogical tool we have. The important question is how likely are we to be wrong when making interpersonal comparisons. If you believe that the relative values people place on wealth vary greatly and with no conceivable pattern as Jonathan Wilde seems to believe, then interpersonal comparisons are very likely to be wrong almost all the time. If, on the other hand, you believe that the relative values people place on wealth are for the most part consistent across people and only a small minority are outliers (the Bill Gates who values a marginal dollar just as much as a pauper, or a pauper who chooses to remain in poverty simply because he doesn’t much care for wealth), then interpersonal comparisons, while imperfect, can still be a useful and often necessary tool for achieving desirable consequences.