Hoppe: “The best one may hope for…”
Sep 26, 04 | 7:40 am by John T. KennedyHoppe on immigration policy:
What should one hope for and advocate as the relatively correct immigration policy, however, as long as the democratic central state is still in place and successfully arrogates the power to determine a uniform national immigration policy? The best one may hope for, even if it goes against the “nature” of a democracy and thus is not very likely to happen, is that the democratic rulers act as if they were the personal owners of the country and as if they had to decide who to include and who to exclude from their own personal property (into their very own houses).
I certainly see the economic point in this. Holding a nations property in common leads to the Tragedy of the Commons. A monarchy avoids this because the nation’s property is effectively the private property of an individual. It seems plausible on it’s face that we might prefer that this democracy behaved more like a monarchy than a democracy, at least in some respects.
Hoppe continues:
This means following a policy of utmost discrimination: of strict discrimination in favor of the human qualities of skill, character, and cultural compatibility.
Well. Let’s think about this.
I think that’s fine for an individual. But should this personal practice be translated into public policy? What is benign in private life quickly turns malignant in the public sphere.
What would what Hoppe is hoping for look like? Andy Duncan quotes Hoppe:
There can be no tolerance toward democrats and communists in a libertarian social order. They will have to be physically separated and expelled from society. Likewise, in a covenant founded for the purpose of protecting family and kin, there can be no tolerance toward those habitually promoting lifestyles incompatible with this goal. They – the advocates of alternative, non-family and kin-centred lifestyles such as, for instance, individual hedonism, parasitism, nature-environment worship, homosexuality, or communism – will have to be physically removed from society, too, if one is to maintain a libertarian order.
It would be harmless for Hoppe to so discriminate as in individual in a free market, but can one doubt that this is precisely what he’d like to see enacted in public policy? As collective public policy this is monstrous.
Do Hoppe’s associates at Lew Rockwell’s sites want to defend this? Will any take public issue with it?
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 9:05 am
I wouldn’t exactly call such discrimination harmless, even as an individual in a free market. One can harm a person without violating their rights.
Further, by discriminating against “the advocates of alternative, non-family and kin-centred lifestyles,” those of us who dislike bigoted social conservatives would likely disassociate from them, thereby the discriminators cause more harm for themselves than they intended to cause for others.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 9:11 am
“One can harm a person without violating their rights.
How?
“Further, by discriminating against “the advocates of alternative, non-family and kin-centred lifestyles,” those of us who dislike bigoted social conservatives would likely disassociate from them, thereby the discriminators cause more harm for themselves than they intended to cause for others.”
I assume he’d welcome that prospect if he got to know you.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 9:20 am
How?
Do market transactions benefit both parties, John? If so, then denying a person access to these same transactions harms them relative to their condition had no discrimination been exercised. Depriving a person of a choice may not be a rights violation, but it certainly isn’t “harmless” in an economic sense.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 9:28 am
So that this conversation can proceed productively, there are two types of harm that are being conflated:
1. Legal harm - JTK’s - a violation or abrogation of some right or privilege under law
2. Harm in the general sense - Micha’s - a denial of something that would improve a person’s situation
I can refuse to sell to Mexicans, harming them in the general sense, but not harming them in the legal sense (anti-discrimination laws aside).
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 9:34 am
Micha,
“Do market transactions benefit both parties, John? If so, then denying a person access to these same transactions harms them relative to their condition had no discrimination been exercised.”
I do not harm you by simply declining to benefit you.
You would benefit me if you gave me $100, but you don’t harm me if you decide to keep it instead.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 9:40 am
I do not harm you by simply declining to benefit you.
Yes, in fact you do, in the economic sense (or general sense, to use Holmes’ term). Further, discrimination causes non-market harm as well. Hateful language, the imposition of fear and shame, denial of past crimes done to the victim, and so forth. While none of these may be rights violations, they are still forms of harm. Austrians should know this well, considering their emphasis on psychic profit as opposed to mere financial profit. The flip-side of profit is loss, and discrimination causes psychic loss, aka harm.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 9:54 am
You would benefit me if you gave me $100, but you don’t harm me if you decide to keep it instead.
I’m not sure if this is particularly relevant here, but if I recall correctly, under common law, sometimes a party can be held liable if he promises to give a gift and later reneges. Although one requirement of contract law is that both parties must provide adequate consideration for the courts to consider the contract valid, if the intended recipient relied to his detriment on the assurances of the other party that the gift would be given, we hold the declared gift-giver responsible for the harm he caused the intended recipient.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 10:01 am
It’s not relevant, by your argument you harm me economically simply by not giving me half your money. And you harm me even more by not giving me the other half.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 12:06 pm
Opportunity cost is real, and important. If MG needs half of JTK’s money for a liver transplant, then the transfer of resources is a net gain to the MG-JTK system. JTK’s refusal to give MG the money has, as it’s opportunity cost, MG’s unfortunate demise.
Of course this kind of argument has been used by socialists for ages to justify forced wealth redistribution of all sorts. The results of these efforts are quite well known to everyone here.
The proper solution in this case would be for MG to sell JTK on why giving MG half of his money would be a noble and proper enterprise.
Most of these sorts of arguments involve quibbling over where the zero point between “helping” and “harming” lies. I’m not sure if the answer influences moral decisions much. I suspect the math is easiest if we define, “Sitting on our ass and doing nothing” as the zero point.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 4:39 pm
There’s no need to define a zero point at all. These terms are relative and thus useful for comparing one or more counterfactual situations to the status quo or to each other. Who benefits if we make change X? Who loses? These benefits and losses caused by change X are determined relative to pre-X circumstances.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 4:50 pm
One can harm a person without violating their rights.
How?
If you’re dying of thirst on my doorstep and I withhold my water, haven’t I harmed you by virtue of doing nothing? You die, do you not? Yet nobody’s rights were violated.
If we are best friends, and one day I stop hanging out with you and say you’re unworthy of being my friend (maybe I’m a jerk?), haven’t I harmed you? Yet nobody’s rights were violated.
The word “harm” is being used in two senses here, 1) a course of action of allowing his circumstances to result in his manifest manifest misery (by doing nothing to him), and 2) a course of action of accelerating his bad circumstances to result in his manifest misery (e.g. by killing him). Whether I kill a person or allow him to die of thirst, hasn’t “harm” been done to that person? In the former case “Stefan” is the subject of the verb, in the second case it is not.
Bottom line: Harm can still come to you whether I am the one doing it or not; only in the case where I am somehow responsible for causing it do we say I am morally at fault.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 5:55 pm
“There can be no tolerance toward democrats and communists in a libertarian social order. They will have to be physically separated and expelled from society. Likewise, in a covenant founded for the purpose of protecting family and kin, there can be no tolerance toward those habitually promoting lifestyles incompatible with this goal. They � the advocates of alternative, non-family and kin-centred lifestyles such as, for instance, individual hedonism, parasitism, nature-environment worship, homosexuality, or communism � will have to be physically removed from society, too, if one is to maintain a libertarian order.”
Phisycally removed? If by the use of statist force, then it’s another proof HHH is a crypto-national socialist (I haven’t said ‘a Hitlerite nazi’; national socialism doesn’t have to be NSDAP-like and genocidal), with authoritarian views that he (unsuccesfully) tries to hide with the demagoguery.
If by a voluntary choice, then it’s not only compatible with libertarian principles, but also a wonderful idea to be turned against the paleo-con bigots (sometimes also called ‘paleocreep’; I would be even less delicate and call them ‘paleocrap’).
After all, in the free society, everyone has the RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE; Hoppe may discriminate immigrants, hippies and haedonists, I may discriminate him and similiar xenophobes. Furthermore, the university he teaches at, along with his campus is a voluntary organisation, too, and it may set policies they see fit, eg. ban on dissemination of racial prejudice or anti-immigrant stances. So, he should be eager to accept the outcome if the campus decided to expel him for spreading his views. And he may be sure, that would *I* have been a member of the campus, I wouled certainly start a disciplinary action against him with a purpose to do so.
So, the paleocons as Hoppe may be discriminated against. As they are a small minority, and most of the NORMAL people would refuse to do business, shake hands, or make friends with them, there will be nothing left they can do except to form their own “SECT” or “COMMUNE”, which will be a kind of voluntary ghetto, where they will be able to have the companionship ONLY of their “Masterrace” fellow-travellers. They will probably be happy and like it, but even if not, I don’t care. At least the society will be freed from the elements that may undermine the libertarian order by attempting to turn the tide of openness, progress, internationality and friendship.
In Liberty,
Critto
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:02 pm
<>JTK: Y wld bnft m f y gv m $100, bt y dn’t hrm m f y dcd t kp t nstd.
Mch: ‘m nt sr f ths s prtclrly rlvnt hr, bt f rcll crrctly, ndr cmmn lw….
<stmp>
Mch, y nd t nscrw yr crnm, scp t ll th pddng, nd rnsrt yr brn.
Hnstly.
Ystrdy cldn’t b sn ngh.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:08 pm
Micha,
“I wouldn’t exactly call such discrimination harmless, even as an individual in a free market. One can harm a person without violating their rights.
Further, by discriminating against “the advocates of alternative, non-family and kin-centred lifestyles,” those of us who dislike bigoted social conservatives would likely disassociate from them, thereby the discriminators cause more harm for themselves than they intended to cause for others.”
Harm may occur in result of many of human actions. Eg. to reject someone’s courting may hurt very much for the rejected person . It is, however, the kind of harm that is *legitimate*, as it derives from the free choice, and thus, it may NOT be penalized by law in any way.
I will use an example: if some leftists attack McDonald’s by throwing bricks and stones at its windows, by whacking its workers with baseball bats, and by setting the arson inside, they commit the VIOLENCE, and the McD has the right to prevent it. If they defame McDonalds by FALSELY saying, that it adds ricin (a strong toxin) to its hamburgers, they commit FRAUD against Mc, and again, it has the right to legal action against them. If, however, they call people to boycott McDonald, for example because they are vegetarians and oppose killing cattle for beef and pork, or by saying, that the ‘junk food’ is unhealthy (which is right, at least to some extent), then McDonald does NOT have any legal right to prevent the harm such action causes, even if it makes them bankrupt.
And similiarly, if I whacked Hoppe with a baseball bat, I would commit violence. If I falsely accused him of paedophilia, I would commit fraud. If, however, I denounce him as a person based on the views he expresses (eg. anti-immigration stance, the elements of national socialism and authoritarianism), and which views I reject, then it’s OKAY, because it is MY RIGHT to choose my sides and friends.
On the other hand, it would be violation of MY rights, if either McDonald’s, or Hoppe, or anyone else was allowed to FORCE me to have contacts with them, or else face the suit for ‘discrimination’.
The case of promising to give someone a gift is another thing. One should KEEP HIS (or her) WORD, and if one breaks it, it may amount to fraud. Since I, for example, have NEVER promised any of the paleocons that I will accept them as friends, I have no moral obligation to do so.
In Liberty,
Critto
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:09 pm
Mike,
That’s nice. The thing is, libertarians who have any knowledge of the theory and practice of law tend to have great respect for the common law. The fact that you don’t says more about you than it does about me. You and Kennedy are simply being naive if you think you can replace hundreds of years of common law with some simplistic libertarian definitions. Even Saint Rand knew that much.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:13 pm
Just adding to my statement … “On the other hand, it would be violation of MY rights, if either McDonald’s, or Hoppe, or anyone else was allowed to FORCE me to have contacts with them, or else face the suit for ‘discrimination’.”
Furthermore, such a situation would lead to the LEGALIZATION OF RAPE. Some person could say, that refusing to have sex with him (or her) is a case of DISCRIMINATION, and causes HARM, and thus, “Justice X, your Honor, I appeal that you forced the person I chose to have sex with me” (I think it’s a good and STRONG point to argue with the people who think discrimination should be penalized, and that the scope of anti-discrimination law should be expanded).
In Liberty,
Critto
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:14 pm
Ghertner: I’m not sure if this is particularly relevant here, but if I recall correctly, under common law,…
It isn’t particularly relevant here.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:15 pm
Critto,
You’re preaching to the choir. My intention was only to point out the existence of harmful acts (or non-acts) other than rights-violations.
But while we’re on the topic…
If they defame McDonalds by FALSELY saying, that it adds ricin (a strong toxin) to its hamburgers, they commit FRAUD against Mc, and again, it has the right to legal action against them.
What’s wrong with fraud, anyway? Are people entitled to a good reputation? Why does this not fall under free speech?
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:17 pm
and besides, common law may mean ANYTHING, but in Poland it means NOTHING. Simply, there is NO common law, there are NO jury trials, NO precedent system. All law is statutory and interpreted by the government and judges. It stinks, I know. In the days of yore, in Poland during the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, there were lots of things which resembled common law. It was even better, because the private deals were more important than law, and the king had virtually NO power.
In Liberty,
Critto
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:22 pm
Mch, ‘m nt drssng p n fthrs fr yr Wht Mn’s Ghst Dnc, s jst frgt t lrdy.
Pddn’ Hd.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:28 pm
Lopez,
Not only do I think it’s relevant, but I think its the right decision, too. If I promise to give you something and make this promise official through witnesses, written statement of intent, etc., and you rely to your detriment on my assurances, why should I not be held responsible if I renege? One purpose of contracts is to foster trust between parties so they can focus on the long-term. If two people sign a contract with each other, and one of them later reneges to the detriment of the other, why shouldn’t the unfaithful party be held accountable for the costs he imposed on the other party?
My point is not to argue in favor of anti-discrimination laws, but that simplistic libertarian statements of natural rights leave an enormous number of holes for the common law to fill in.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:35 pm
Ghretner: Not only do I think it’s relevant, but I think its the right decision, too. If I promise to give you something…
What has Kennedy promised you, or vice versa?
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:43 pm
Nothing, the point is only that there are forms of harm that do not fit neatly within simplistic libertarian theory.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 6:55 pm
I think Holmes made this point very clearly:
So that this conversation can proceed productively, there are two types of harm that are being conflated:
1. Legal harm - JTK’s - a violation or abrogation of some right or privilege under law
2. Harm in the general sense - Micha’s - a denial of something that would improve a person’s situation
Your definition of harm does not fit within simplistic libertarian theory, and I don’t see how it fits within common law, either.
September 26th, 2004 at Sep 26, 04 | 7:02 pm
I have not given a strict definition of harm. I agree with Holmes’ distinction. However, note that (a) harm in the general sense is a legitimate use of the term and (b) harm in the legal sense includes more than simplistic libertarian theory would indicate.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 12:25 am
Actually, if I am dying of thirst in the desert, you don’t harm me by not selling me a bottle of water. I remain in the same physical state I was before you refused to sell me the bottle. Of course, I may be unhappy that you refused to sell me the water, but I’m also unhappy that everyone I want to have sex with does not want to indulge me.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 1:01 am
Acutally, no, Micha.
Both (a) as you actually defined it, and (b) are wrong.
Witholding a possible voluntary transaction is not committing harm in any meaningful sense. There are billions of people I could possibly send money to. To say that I (and nearly everyone else on earth) am harming them makes the concept of harm pretty meaningless as I see it.
In the legal (natural law) sense, harm consists of rights violations.
There is a sense in which harm exists, extra legally, however. If I actively work against your interests through peaceful means, I am harming you in the moral sense but not the legal one.
For instance:
If I refuse to hire someone with pink hair, I am not harming him.
If I actively (and effectively) campaign to persuade people not to hire people with pink hair, or even just that one person, then you could make a case that I am harming him.
If I call him “a pink-haired faggot weirdo”, I am harming him.
To put it simply, I don’t believe in passive harm.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 1:04 am
Oh, and… awesome post, JTK!
This hits right at the core.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 1:15 am
Yr “pnt” s *bllsht*; nd y’r strtchng th dfntn f “hrm” nt th ttrly rbtrry (xprssly n rdr t pply th lbl t ctvts whch mnfstly <>rn’t F, whch s th*cntxt* s “smplstc lbrtrns” wld s wrd lk “hrm” t cnnt).
Stp bn’ pddn’ hd.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 2:48 am
I have often thought that the best term to describe Hans Hermann Hoppe’s political views is “anarcho-fascist.” Here, he seems to be quite intent on proving me right: “There can be no tolerance toward democrats and communists in a libertarian social order. They will have to be physically separated and expelled from society. Likewise, in a covenant founded for the purpose of protecting family and kin, there can be no tolerance toward those habitually promoting lifestyles incompatible with this goal. They the advocates of alternative, non-family and kin-centred lifestyles such as, for instance, individual hedonism, parasitism, nature-environment worship, homosexuality, or communism will have to be physically removed from society, too, if one is to maintain a libertarian order.”
Meanwhile, Michae Ghertner and John Kennedy have a dispute over the meaning of “harm”. Joshua Holmes tried to clarify the difference as one over two different senses of “harm”. I think that Holmes is partly right, but I don’t think that he’s drawn the distinction properly. I think there’s a good case to be made that, as Kennedy and others have been arguing, I’m not best seen as harming you simply by declining to deal with you, even if the deal would make you better off. But that doesn’t mean that there is no sense of harm other than the “legal” (initiation of force) sense. This should be obvious from the fact that we ordinarily say that someone can harm herself, by, e.g., taking dangerous drugs, or jumping off a cliff without a parachute. (You can hardly count as initiating force against yourself–at least, for those of us who reject paternalistic law.)
And there are plenty of forms of what would uncontroversially be thought of as “harm” that you can do to others without violating any of their rights. You can be cruel, callous, deceitful (without making any fraudulent transaction), unfaithful, etc. If you told a friend many painful secrets about your life, in confidence, and he proceeded to use all of those to mock you behind your back, very few people would be willing to say that the sleazebag hadn’t done you any harm. But he hasn’t initiated force against you, either–being faithless is despicable, but it’s not criminal. So this is one example of a “harm” you could not stop by force (or take compensation for). There are plenty of other examples out there, and I think that hateful (but nonviolent) bigotry of the sort that Hoppe apparently considers part of the natural order is one such example.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 5:25 am
Actually, if I am dying of thirst in the desert, you don’t harm me by not selling me a bottle of water.
I’m sorry if I was unclear Mr. Fulwiler; indeed you do not cause any harm to the dying man by refusing to give him any water. It would be harm, however, to tease him in a cruel fashion, e.g. by leaving the water where he can reach it, then pulling it away. Rad Geek makes the point best in the previous post–not only can you harm yourself, but there are all sorts of ways to harm other people without violating their rights. He mentions mocking a friend behind his back, being “cruel, callous, deceitful” as examples. Adem Kupi mentions peacefully working against someone’s interests–all these examples seem to fit with what we mean by the word “harm”, and yet no rights are violated because to violate someone’s rights means to violate their property or person in some way, and clearly killing or beating someone is not the only way to work against their interests.
Small personal story: My best friend broke up with his girlfriend a year ago when he found out she’d been seeing someone else for a while. Given that she almost certainly knew he would find that behavior unacceptable, and given that he derived benefit from her companionship, did she not “harm” him in some fashion, despite never once violating his rights?
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 5:53 am
<>f rfs t hr smn wth pnk hr, m nt hrmng hm.
f ctvly (nd ffctvly) cmpgn t prsd ppl nt t hr ppl wth pnk hr, r vn jst tht n prsn, thn y cld mk cs tht m hrmng hm.
f cll hm ” pnk-hrd fggt wrd”, m hrmng hm.
*Nn* f ths r F, whch s wht “hrm” s phmsm fr.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 2:49 pm
What is “IOF”?
For all those who still think that the libertarian definition of “harm” is its ONE TRUE MEANING, and that acts which do not violate rights cannot cause harm, consider the case of competition. I move my hot dog stand near your hot dog stand, thereby significantly reducing your revenue and profits. This is a case where my act harmed you, not merely by depriving you of a possible benefit, but by making you worse off because of my act. Yet any reasonable person (i.e. someone not blinded by simplistic libertarian dogma) will recognize that this is a form of harm.
There are good economic reasons for why this form of harm shouldn’t be legally prohibited. Namely, because the harm between the two hot dog owners is merely a net transfer, while consumers enjoy lower prices. Over all, its a net benefit. Rights violations, like murder or theft, tend to be net losses to society.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 4:34 pm
IOF = Initiation of force.
——————–
“No one may INITIATE force.” — Saint Rand
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 4:42 pm
Your “point” is *bullshit*; and you’re stretching the definition of “harm” into the utterly arbitrary (expressly in order to apply the label to activities which manifestly aren’t IOF, which is the*context* us “simplistic libertarians” would use a word like “harm” to connote).
Stop bein’ a puddin’ head.
harm (n) 1. Physical or psychological injury or damage.
2. Wrong; evil.
Not to split hairs, but it seem spretty clear that people use the word “harm” to refer to psychological as well as physical damage–leaving aside for the moment whether or not I am “harming” someone by opening up a hot dog stand next to his, don’t I still “harm” him by the examples discussed above, e.g. being “cruel, callous, deceitful”? Why not just call property violations “coercion” and call actions resulting, indirectly or not, in damage “harm”?
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 7:17 pm
Micha, you’re always making these “St. Rand” digs. Why do you do that? I would be very surprised to hear that anyone here considered him/herself an “Objectivist”.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 7:29 pm
I do it to piss off the Randians. If no one here is a Randian, what do they care? And if they are Randians — and much of the language, arguments, and assumptions used by many of the writers here indicates that they are — too bad. Randians are silly.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 7:34 pm
It’s roughly as appropriate as it would be for me to pepper my comments at Catallarchy with “St. Rothbard” digs.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 7:39 pm
Please do! For all his faults, I’d rather be associated with Rothbard than Rand.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 7:54 pm
Okay people, you heard him. Please pepper Catallarchy comments, especially to posts by Micha, with disparging remarks about “St. Rothbard”. Don’t worry about the topic.
(Where’s Mikko when you need him? Not sure I remember right, but didn’t Swanson like to do that too? )
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 8:35 pm
Uh, Kennedy, have I been peppering No Treason with disparaging remarks about Saint Rand regardless of the topic? No, I’ve been deploying my anti-Randian barbs sparingly, and only where they are in some way connected to the argument. But feel free to call me on it whenever I make an argument or use a phrase known to be especially Rothbardian.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 8:36 pm
(Helpful hint: You would have better luck with a “St. Friedman” strategy.)
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 8:57 pm
Micha,
“Uh, Kennedy, have I been peppering No Treason with disparaging remarks about Saint Rand regardless of the topic?”
Yes. And I’ve brought it to your attention on more than one occasion.
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 9:08 pm
Peppering? Completely unrelated to the argument?
September 27th, 2004 at Sep 27, 04 | 9:13 pm
Peppering? Yes. Completely unrelated?</i> Regardless of topic.
September 28th, 2004 at Sep 28, 04 | 12:02 am
Micha:
I’m not aware of any common law rule along the lines you mention. Generally if X tells Y he will give her a gift and Y then buys a holiday in anticipation, Y has no remedy if X refuses to pay. For the “promise” to be enforceable without consideration, it would have to be made under seal (i.e. as a “deed”).
This is just one aspect of the broadly libertarian nature of common law - viz extreme reluctance to impose positive duties upon people to confer benefits upon others (c.f collectivists of all kinds who glory in imposing such duties) - even to the extent of denying the enforceability of a promise to give a gift.
September 28th, 2004 at Sep 28, 04 | 3:09 am
Ghertner: I do it to piss off the Randians. If no one here is a Randian, what do they care?
Because you’re better than that, Micha. Crap like that is above you, you’d be better off making the rational arguments you’re capable of.
September 28th, 2004 at Sep 28, 04 | 3:36 am
Julius,
I’m fairly sure, although I could be mistaken, that what I said is correct. I recall the principle from a case I read in a business law class a few years ago involving a declared intention to donate to a charitable organization which was later rescinded.
Here’s one source for my claim:
“To be legally binding as a contract, a promise must be exchanged for adequate consideration. Adequate consideration is a benefit or detriment which a party receives which reasonably and fairly induces them to make the promise/contract . For example, promises that are purely gifts are not considered enforceable because the personal satisfaction the grantor of the promise may receive from the act of giving is normally not considered adequate consideration. Certain promises that are not considered contracts may, in limited circumstances, be enforced if one party has relied to his detriment on the assurances of the other party.”
September 28th, 2004 at Sep 28, 04 | 3:39 am
Oh, come on, Lopez. I’m no rational ubermensch like Kennedy. Allow me to worship my whims every once in a while.
September 28th, 2004 at Sep 28, 04 | 3:52 am
Whimsy is fine: No one’ll mistake A Distillation Of The Immigration-Skeptic Position As Presented By Lewrockwell.com, or Rat-A-Tat-Tat Go Da LRC Gats (search for it in here) for a serious argument.
But just saying “St. Rand” over and over again isn’t terribly clever. It’s in your best interests not to do that sort of thing.
September 28th, 2004 at Sep 28, 04 | 4:08 am
Well, as claimed earlier, I don’t refer to the One That Shall Remain Nameless merely as a poor excuse for comedy or just to piss you guys off (although both are part of why I do it). I generally incorporate it into an argument I’m making or when I’m complaining about silly libertarian dogmatism masquerading as rational philosophy.
September 28th, 2004 at Sep 28, 04 | 4:10 am
It’s old.
September 28th, 2004 at Sep 28, 04 | 4:29 am
De gustibus non est disputandum.
September 28th, 2004 at Sep 28, 04 | 4:42 am
“I’m no rational ubermensch like Kennedy.”
And he wonders why he doesn’t get the chicks….
September 28th, 2004 at Sep 28, 04 | 1:08 pm
“Randians” might be “silly”, Ghertner, but you’re a fucking impertinent punk, just like I said.
September 29th, 2004 at Sep 29, 04 | 6:47 am
Stefan: “Small personal story: My best friend broke up with his girlfriend a year ago when he found out she’d been seeing someone else for a while. Given that she almost certainly knew he would find that behavior unacceptable, and given that he derived benefit from her companionship, did she not “harm” him in some fashion, despite never once violating his rights?”
No, she did not. First, I’m assuming he was boffing her, which is usually the reason behind such escalated premature emotional claims (when kiddies play at being adult). So he was upset that the woman he was fornicating with cheated on him… jesus, it’s like when I hear one gangsta has shot another, I don’t feel a lot of compassion.
Second, no coherent, *actionable* definition of harm can be found in such behavior.
September 29th, 2004 at Sep 29, 04 | 4:47 pm
So he was upset that the woman he was fornicating with cheated on him… jesus, it’s like when I hear one gangsta has shot another, I don’t feel a lot of compassion.
You have a pretty funny view of relationships if the mafia is the first analogy that pops into your head.
First, I’m assuming he was boffing her, which is usually the reason behind such escalated premature emotional claims (when kiddies play at being adult).
It might well usually be the reason, but are you saying in general that mature adults can never feel genuine sadness or loss? That someone, who, loses a loved one is necessarily making “premature, emotional claims”? I think it will be related to your answer to the next point….
Second, no coherent, *actionable* definition of harm can be found in such behavior.
But the definition of “harm” is precisely what we were debating. If you’ll scroll up to my last post, I refer to the fact that most people accept “harm” to mean either physical or psychological harm. Rad Geek says it very nicely:
And there are plenty of forms of what would uncontroversially be thought of as “harm” that you can do to others without violating any of their rights. You can be cruel, callous, deceitful (without making any fraudulent transaction), unfaithful, etc. If you told a friend many painful secrets about your life, in confidence, and he proceeded to use all of those to mock you behind your back, very few people would be willing to say that the sleazebag hadn’t done you any harm. But he hasn’t initiated force against you, either–being faithless is despicable, but it’s not criminal.
The point is that–to paraphrase Micha–that there are forms of harm that just don’t fit nicely into libertarian theory. As libertarians, our principle ideas concern force, violence, coercion, the state, etc; and yes, sometimes statists do use the second sense of harm to argue for the state, e.g. when going on about the “needs” of some supposedly poor, disadvantaged group that ought to be supported by theft. Micha is cautioning against myopia–the mistaken belief that libertarianism is just all there is to life, the universe, and everything.
September 29th, 2004 at Sep 29, 04 | 4:54 pm
The problems with basing any libertarian notion of aggression or rights on “harm” or nebulous concepts like this has been explained elsewhere. My book re view of Patrick Burke’s book No Harm, for one, on my site: http://www.stephankinsella.com/publications Also, Hoppe talks about the problem of saying you harm someone if you redue the value rather than the integrity of their property, in his A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (search for value, etc.). www.HansHoppe.com/publications . Also I think some have pointed out the problems with Jan Lester’s mealy-mouthed formulation that you can’t “impose” “costs” on people, in his book on Leviathan–see e.g. David Gordon’s review in the JLS avail at www.Mises.org
September 29th, 2004 at Sep 29, 04 | 5:12 pm
The problems with basing any libertarian notion of aggression or rights on “harm” or nebulous concepts like this
If you’ll scroll up the page, you’ll see the following key point in the post:
The point is that–to paraphrase Micha–that there are forms of harm that just don’t fit nicely into libertarian theory.
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Key Point!
And you concluded I wanted to make a libertarian theory about something I claim is outside libertarian theory? Just making sure….
September 29th, 2004 at Sep 29, 04 | 5:16 pm
S, wh dltd th Blly Bck pst whch ws n ths thrd lst nght?
September 29th, 2004 at Sep 29, 04 | 5:36 pm
(h nvr mnd. JTK? Y’r n-st srch-ngn nds t b *whppd*.)
September 29th, 2004 at Sep 29, 04 | 5:37 pm
“The point is that–to paraphrase Micha–that there are forms of harm that just don’t fit nicely into libertarian theory.
And you concluded I wanted to make a libertarian theory about something I claim is outside libertarian theory? Just making sure…. “
Did I say I concluded that? I’m simply pointing out why we libertarians are interested not in “harm” but in aggression. I.e., my point is really, we should not even discuss harm *qua libertarians*, any more than we should debate qua libertarians what kind of toothpaste to use.
September 29th, 2004 at Sep 29, 04 | 5:48 pm
Did I say I concluded that? I’m simply pointing out why we libertarians are interested not in “harm” but in aggression. I.e., my point is really, we should not even discuss harm *qua libertarians*, any more than we should debate qua libertarians what kind of toothpaste to use.
If you think that, why are you even posting to this thread? By now I realize scrolling up the page must be quite familiar to you, but I recommend you do it just one more time…notice, in particular, the comment by Micha & JTK that started this discussion.
September 29th, 2004 at Sep 29, 04 | 5:53 pm
Thanks for the recommendation. I’ll try to check it out on NetFlix.
September 29th, 2004 at Sep 29, 04 | 7:29 pm
Micha (quoting):
“Certain promises that are not considered contracts may, in limited circumstances, be enforced if one party has relied to his detriment on the assurances of the other party.”
I suspect the author was thinking about estoppel. However, I can think of no circumstances in which estoppel would enable somebody to enforce a gratuitous promise for a gift.